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Abstract. The EnRUPT hash functions were proposed by O’Neil, Nohl
and Henzen [5] as candidates for the SHA-3 competition, organised by
NIST [4]. The proposal contains seven concrete hash functions, each hav-
ing a different digest length.
We present a practical collision attack on each of these seven EnRUPT
variants. The time complexity of our attack varies from 236 to 240 round
computations, depending on the EnRUPT variant, and the memory re-
quirements are negligible. We demonstrate that our attack is practical
by giving an actual collision example for EnRUPT-256.
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1 Introduction
Cryptographic hash functions are important cryptographic primitives that
are employed in a vast number of applications, such as digital signatures
and commitment schemes. They are expected to possess several security
properties, one of which is collision resistance. Informally, collision resis-
tance means that it should be hard to find two distinct messages m 6= m′
that hash to the same value, i.e., h(m) = h(m′).
Many popular hash functions, such as MD5, SHA-1 and SHA-2 share
a common design principle. The recent advances in the cryptanalysis of
these hash functions have raised serious concerns concerning their long-
term security. This motivates the design of new hash functions, based
on different design strategies. The National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) has decided to hold a public competition, the SHA-3
competition, to develop a new cryptographic hash function standard [4].
The EnRUPT hash functions were proposed by O’Neil, Nohl and Hen-
zen [5] as candidates for NIST’s SHA-3 competition. The proposal con-
tains seven concrete EnRUPT variants, each having a different digest
length.
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Table 1. EnRUPT Parameters
EnRUPT digest word parallelisation security number of
variant length size level parameter state words
h w P s H
EnRUPT-128 128 bits 32 bits 2 4 8
EnRUPT-160 160 bits 32 bits 2 4 10
EnRUPT-192 192 bits 32 bits 2 4 12
EnRUPT-224 224 bits 64 bits 2 4 8
EnRUPT-256 256 bits 64 bits 2 4 8
EnRUPT-384 384 bits 64 bits 2 4 12
EnRUPT-512 512 bits 64 bits 2 4 16
In this paper, we analyse EnRUPT and show that none of the pro-
posed EnRUPT variants is collision resistant. We present a practical col-
lision attack requiring only 236 to 240 EnRUPT round computations,
depending on the EnRUPT variant. This is significantly less than the
O(2n/2) hash computations which are required for a generic collision at-
tack based on the birthday paradox.
The structure of this paper is as follows. A short description of En-
RUPT is given in Sect. 2. Section 3 introduces the basic strategy we use
to find collisions for EnRUPT, which is based on the work by Chabaud
and Joux [2] and Rijmen and Oswald [8]. Sections 4, 5 and 6 apply this
basic attack strategy to EnRUPT, step by step. Our results, including
an example collision for EnRUPT-256, are presented in Sect. 7. Finally,
Sect. 8 concludes.
2 Description of EnRUPT
In this section, we give a short description of the seven EnRUPT variants
that were proposed as SHA-3 candidates [5]. All share the same structure
and use the same round function. The only differences lie in the parame-
ters used. Table 1 gives the values of these parameters for each EnRUPT
variant.
2.1 The EnRUPT Hash Functions
The structure shared by all EnRUPT hash functions can be split into
four phases: preprocessing, message processing, finalisation and output.
Figure 1 contains a description of the EnRUPT hash functions in pseu-
docode.
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In the preprocessing phase (lines 2–4) the input message is padded
to be a multiple of w bits, where w is the word size. Depending on the
EnRUPT variant, the word size w is 32 or 64 bits, see Table 1. The padded
message is then split into an integer number of w-bit words mi.
The internal state of EnRUPT consists of several w-bit words: H state
words xi, P ‘delta accumulators’ di, and a round counter r. All of these are
initialised to zero. The parameter P is equal to 2 for all seven EnRUPT
variants. The value of H depends on the digest length, as indicated in
Table 1.
Then, in the message processing phase (lines 5–8), the round function
is called once for each w-bit padded message word mi. Each call to the
round function updates the internal state 〈d, x, r〉. A detailed description
of the EnRUPT round function is given in the next section, Sect. 2.2.
After all message words have been processed, a finalisation is per-
formed (lines 9–13). The EnRUPT round function is called once with the
length of the (unpadded) message, represented as a w-bit unsigned inte-
ger. Then, H blank rounds, i.e., calls to the round function with a zero
message word input, are performed.
Finally, in the output phase (lines 14–18), the message digest is gen-
erated one w-bit word at a time. The EnRUPT round function is called
h/w times and, after each call, the content of the ‘delta accumulator’ d0
is output.
2.2 The EnRUPT Round Function
The EnRUPT round function is based entirely on a number of simple
operations on words of w bits, such as bit shifts, bit rotations, exclusive
OR and addition modulo 2w. The round function consists of s ·P identical
steps, where s and P are parameters of the hash function. As indicated
in Table 1, s = 4 and P = 2 for all seven proposed EnRUPT variants.
Thus, the EnRUPT round function consists of eight steps. Figure 2 gives
a description of the EnRUPT round function in pseudocode.
In each step, several words of the state are selected (lines 3–7) and
combined into an intermediate value f (lines 9–10). Note that line 10
could equally be described as a multiplication with 9 modulo 2w. The
intermediate value f is then used to update one state word, xγ , and one
‘delta accumulator’, di mod P .
After all steps have been performed, the round counter is incremented
by the number of steps that were carried out, s · P . Finally, the input
message word m is injected into one word of the internal state, the ‘delta
accumulator’ dP−1.
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1: function EnRUPT (M)
2: /* Preprocessing */
3: m0, · · · ,mt ←M || 1 || 0
w−(|M|+1 mod w) s.t ∀i, 0 ≤ i ≤ t : |mi| = w
4: d0, · · · , dP−1, x0, · · · , xH−1, r ← 0, · · · , 0
5: /* Message processing */
6: for i = 0 to n do
7: 〈d, x, r〉 ← round(〈d, x, r〉 ,mi)
8: end for
9: /* Finalisation */
10: 〈d, x, r〉 ← round(〈d, x, r〉 , uintw(|M |))
11: for i = 1 to H do
12: 〈d, x, r〉 ← round(〈d, x, r〉 , 0)
13: end for
14: /* Output */
15: for i = 0 to h/w − 1 do
16: 〈d, x, r〉 ← round(〈d, x, r〉 , 0)
17: oi ← d0
18: end for
19: return o0 || · · · || oh/w−1
20: end function
Fig. 1. The EnRUPT Hash Function
1: function round (〈d, x, r〉 ,m)
2: for i = 0 to s · P − 1 do /* An iteration of this loop is denoted a “step” */
3: /* Compute indices */
4: α← r + (i+ 1 mod P ) mod H
5: β ← r + i+ 2P mod H
6: γ ← r + i+ P mod H
7: ξ ← r + i mod H
8: /* Compute intermediate f */
9: e← ((xα ≪ 1)⊕ xβ ⊕ di mod P ⊕ uintw(r + i))≫ w/4
10: f ← (e≪ 3)⊞ e /* Multiplication with 9 modulo 2w */
11: /* Update state */
12: xγ ← xγ ⊕ f
13: di mod P ← di mod P ⊕ xξ ⊕ f
14: end for
15: r ← r + s · P
16: dP−1 ← dP−1 ⊕m /* Message word injection */
17: return 〈d, x, r〉
18: end function
Fig. 2. The EnRUPT Round Function
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3 Basic Attack Strategy
This section gives an overview of the linearisation method for finding
collision differential characteristics for a hash function, which we use to
attack EnRUPT in this work. This method was introduced by Chabaud
and Joux [2], who applied it to SHA-0 and simplified variants thereof.
Later, it was extended further and applied to SHA-1 by Rijmen and
Oswald [8].
A Linear Hash Function. Consider a hypothetical hash function that
consists only of linear operations over GF(2). When the input messages
are restricted to a certain length, each output bit can be written as an
affine function of the input bits. The difference in each output bit is given
by a linear function of the differences in the input bits, as the constants
(if any) cancel.
A message difference that leads to a collision can be found by equating
the output differences to zero, and solving the resulting system of linear
equations over GF(2), for instance using Gauss elimination. Any pair of
messages with this difference will result in a collision.
Linearising a Nonlinear Hash Function. Actual cryptographic hash func-
tions contain (also) nonlinear components, so this method no longer ap-
plies. However, we may still be able to approximate the nonlinear com-
ponents by linear ones and construct a linear approximation of the entire
hash function. For our purpose, a good linear approximation λ(x) of a
nonlinear function γ(x) is such that its differential behaviour is close to
that of γ(x). More formally, the equation
γ(x⊕∆)⊕ γ(x) = λ(x⊕∆)⊕ λ(x) = λ(∆) (1)
should hold for a relatively large fraction of values x. For instance, an
addition modulo 2w could be approximated by a simple XOR operation,
i.e., ignoring the carries.
Finding Collisions. A differential characteristic consists of a message
difference and a list of the differences in all (relevant) intermediate values.
For the linear approximation, it is easy to find a differential characteristic
that leads to a collision with probability one. But for the actual hash
function, this probability will be (much) lower.
If the differential behaviour of all the nonlinear components corre-
sponds to that of the linear approximations they were replaced with, i.e.,
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if (1) holds simultaneously for each nonlinear component, we say that
the differential characteristic is followed. In this case, the message pair
under consideration will not only collide for the linearised hash function,
but also for the original, nonlinear hash function. Such a message pair is
called a conforming message pair.
Hence, a procedure for finding a collision for the nonlinear hash func-
tion could be to find a differential characteristic leading to collisions for a
linearised variant of the hash function. Then, a message pair conforming
to the differential characteristic is searched. In order to lower the com-
plexity of the attack, it is important to maximise the probability that the
differential characteristic is followed, i.e., we need to find a good differen-
tial characteristic.
4 Linearising EnRUPT
We now apply this general strategy to EnRUPT. Recall the description
of the EnRUPT round function in Fig. 2. Note that the only operation
in this round function which is not linear over GF(2), is the modular
addition in line 10. Indeed, the computation of the indices in lines 3–7
and the update of the round counter in line 15 do not depend on the
message being hashed and can thus be precomputed. The same holds for
the inclusion of the round counter in line 9, i.e., this can be seen as an
XOR with a constant. The other operations are all linear over GF(2).
Replacing the modular addition in line 10 with an XOR operation
yields a linearised round function, which we refer to as the EnRUPT-L
round function. The EnRUPT-L hash function, i.e., the hash function
built on this linearised round function, also consists solely of GF(2)-linear
components.
5 The Collision Search
During the collision search phase, many collisions for EnRUPT-L are
constructed, and a collision for EnRUPT is searched among them. Since
only the modular additions (line 10 of Fig. 2) were approximated by XOR,
these are the only places where the propagation of differences could differ
between EnRUPT-L and EnRUPT. Instead of checking for a collision at
the output, we can immediately check if the difference at the output of
each modular addition, i.e., the difference ∆f in the intermediate value f ,
still matches the differential characteristic.
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5.1 An Observation on EnRUPT
We now make an important observation on the structure of the EnRUPT
hash functions. It is possible to find a conforming message pair for a given
differential characteristic one round at a time.
Consider the message word mi, which is injected into the ‘delta accu-
mulator’ dP−1 at the end of round i. In the first (P − 1) steps of the next
round, dP−1 is not used, somi can not influence the behaviour of the mod-
ular additions in these steps. Starting from the P -th step of round (i+1),
however, mi does have an influence.
We can search for a value for mi such that the differential characteris-
tic is followed up to and including the first (P − 1) steps of round (i+2).
Starting with the P -th step of round (i+2), the next message word, mi+1
also influences the modular additions. Thus, we can keepmi fixed, and use
the new freedom available in mi+1 to ensure the differential characteristic
is also followed for the next s · P steps.
This drastically reduces the expected number of trials required to find
a collision. Let pi denote the probability that the differential characteristic
is followed in a block of s · P consecutive steps, starting at the P -th step
of a round. Because we can construct a conforming message pair one word
at a time, the expected number of trials is
∑
i 1/pi rather than
∏
i 1/pi.
In other words, the complexities associated with each block of s ·P steps
should be added together, rather than multiplied. This possibility was
ignored in the security analysis of EnRUPT [5], leading to the wrong
conclusion that attacks based on linearisation do not apply.
5.2 Accelerating the Collision Search
An simple optimisation can be made to the collision search, which will
allow us to ignore the probability associated with one step in each round.
This optimisation is analogous to Wang’s ‘single message modification’,
which was first introduced in the context of MD5 [10].
Consider the P -th step of a round. In this step, the ‘delta accumulator’
dP−1, to which a new message word m was XORed at the end of the
previous round, is used for the first time. More precisely, it is used in
line 9 of Fig. 2 to compute the intermediate value e. Note however that
these computations can be inverted. We can choose the value of e, and
compute backwards to find what the message word m should be to arrive
at this value of e.
The values of e which ensure that the difference propagation of the
modular addition in line 10 of Fig. 2 corresponds to that of its linear
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approximation can be efficiently enumerated. Thus, rather than randomly
picking values for m, we can efficiently sample good values for e in this
step, and compute backwards to find the corresponding m. This ensures
that the first modular addition affected by a message word m will always
exhibit the desired propagation of differences. Thus, the P -th step of every
round can be ignored in the estimation of the complexity of the attack.
6 Finding Good Differential Characteristics
The key to lowering the attack complexity is to find a good differential
characteristic, i.e., a characteristic which is likely to be followed for the
nonlinear hash function. A general approach to this problem, based on
finding low weight codewords in a linear code, was proposed by Rijmen
and Oswald [8] and extended by Pramstaller et al. in [7]. In this section,
we show how to apply this approach to EnRUPT.
6.1 Coding Theory
As observed by Rijmen and Oswald [8], all of the differential characteris-
tics leading to a collision for the linearised hash function can be seen as
the codewords of a linear code.
Consider the EnRUPT-L hash function with a h-bit output length,
and the message input restricted to messages of t message words. Since it
is linear over GF(2), it is possible to express the difference in the output
as a linear function of the difference in the input message m:
[∆o]1×h = [∆m]1×tw · [O]tw×h . (2)
As the modular additions, or rather the multiplications with 9, in the
EnRUPT round function are approximated, we are also interested in the
differences that enter each of these operations. For EnRUPT restricted
to t message blocks, there are t · s · P such operations in total. Hence,
we can combine the input differences to these operations in a 1 × tsPw
bit vector ∆e. Again, for the linear approximation, ∆e is simply a linear
function of the message difference ∆m:
[∆e]1×tsPw = [∆m]1×tw · [E]tw×tsPw . (3)
Putting this together results in a linear code described by the following
generator matrix
G =
[
Itw×tw Etw×tsPw Otw×h
]
. (4)
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Each codeword contains a message difference, the input differences to all
approximated modular additions, and finally the output difference.
Thus, each codeword is in fact simply a differential for EnRUPT-L,
and all differentials for EnRUPT-L are codewords of this code. To restrict
ourselves to collision differentials, i.e., differentials ending in a zero output
difference, we can use Gauss elimination to force the h rightmost columns
of the generator matrix G to zero.
It is well known that the differential behaviour of modular addition
can be approximated by that of XOR when the Hamming weight of the
input difference, ignoring the most significant bit, is small [2,3,7,8]. As
the input differences to the modular additions are part of the codewords,
we will attempt to find a codeword with a low Hamming weight in this
part of the codeword.
6.2 Low Weight Codewords
To find low weight codewords, we used a simple and straightforward al-
gorithm that is based on the assumption that a codeword of very low
weight exists in the code. For our purposes, this is a reasonable assump-
tion, as only a very low weight codeword will lead to an attack faster
than a generic birthday attack. The algorithm is related to the algorithm
of Canteaut and Chabaud [1] and the algorithm used to find low weight
codewords for linearised SHA-1 by Pramstaller et al. [7].
Let G be the generator matrix of the linear code as in (4). We ran-
domly select a set I of (appropriate) columns of the generator matrix G
and force them to zero using Gauss elimination, until only d rows remain,
where d is a parameter of the algorithm. Then, the remaining space of
2d codewords is searched exhaustively. This procedure is repeated until
a codeword of sufficiently low weight is encountered. By replacing only
the oldest column(s) in I, instead of restarting from the beginning every
time, the algorithm can be implemented efficiently in practice.
If a codeword of very low weight exists in the code, it is likely that
all of the columns in the randomly constructed set I will coincide with
zeroes in the codeword, which implies that the codeword will be found in
the exhaustive search. In the case of the codes originating from the seven
linearised EnRUPT variants we consider, this algorithm finds a codeword
of very low weight in a matter of minutes on a PC. Repeated runs of the
algorithm always find the same codewords, so it is reasonable to assume
that these are indeed the best codewords we can find.
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6.3 Estimating the Attack Complexity
Actually, the weight of a codeword is only a heuristic for the attack com-
plexity resulting from the corresponding differential. Codewords with a
lower weight are expected to result in a lower attack complexity, but we
can easily enhance our algorithm to optimise the actual attack complexity,
rather than just a crude heuristic.
The Differential Probability. The probability that a differential character-
istic is followed, is determined by the differences that are input to each of
the multiplications with 9 (line 10 in Fig. 2) that were approximated using
XOR operations. Denote by DP×9(∆) the probability that the propaga-
tion of differences through this nonlinear operation coincides with that of
its linear approximation:
DP×9(∆) = Pr
x
[
(x× 9)⊕ ((x⊕∆)× 9) = ∆⊕ (∆≪ 3)
]
. (5)
The differential probability of modular addition was studied by Lipmaa
and Moriai [3]. Applying their results to this situation, and taking into
account that the three least significant bits of (x ≪ 3) are always zero,
we find the following estimate for DP×9(∆):
DP×9(∆) ≈ 2
−wt
((
∆∨(∆≪3)
)
∧01···1000b
)
. (6)
Even though this estimate ignores the dependency between x and (x ≪
3), this confirms the intuition that a difference ∆ with a low Hamming
weight (ignoring the most significant bit and the three least significant
bits) results in a large probability DP×9(∆). We use this as a heuristic to
find a good differential characteristic: we want to minimise the Hamming
weight of the relevant parts of the differences that are input to the mod-
ular additions. In other words, we want to find a low weight codeword of
the aforementioned linear code, where only the bits that impact DP×9(∆)
are counted.
Exact Computation of the Differential Probability. Computing the exact
value of DP×9(∆) for any given difference ∆ can be done by counting all
the values x for which the differences propagation is as predicted by the
linear approximation. This can be done efficiently as the modular addition
can be represented compactly as a trellis, where each path through the
trellis corresponds to a ‘good’ value of x. Using a slight variant of the
Viterbi algorithm [9], the number of paths in the trellis can be counted
efficiently. While this is very useful for evaluating the attack complexity,
it lacks the intuition we can gather from (6).
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Computing the Attack Complexity. Let pr,i be the differential probability
associated with the modular addition in step i of round r of the differential
characteristic. Recall the observation made in Sect. 5.1, i.e., finding a
conforming message pair can be done one round at a time, or rather one
message word at a time, as this does not coincide precisely with the round
boundaries. Taking this into account, the complexity of finding the j-th
word of a conforming message pair can thus be computed as
Cj =
(
sP−1∏
i=P−1
1
pj+1,i
)(
P−2∏
i=0
1
pj+2,i
)
. (7)
Due to the acceleration technique presented in Sect. 5.2, we can set
pP−1 = 1. With the default EnRUPT parameters (see Table 1), this
then becomes
Cj =
1
pj+1,2
·
1
pj+1,3
·
1
pj+1,4
·
1
pj+1,5
·
1
pj+1,6
·
1
pj+1,7
·
1
pj+2,0
. (8)
Finally, as was explained in Sect. 5.1, note that each message word can be
found independent of the previous ones, due to the newly available degrees
of freedom in each message word. Hence, the overall attack complexity
can simply be computed as the sum of these round complexities:
Ctot =
t∑
j=0
Cj . (9)
Note that, given a differential characteristic, it is easy to compute the
associated attack complexity. Hence, when searching for a good differen-
tial characteristic using the algorithm described in Sect. 6.2, we can use
the actual attack complexity instead of the weight of the codeword. The
algorithm still implicitly uses the weight of a codeword as a heuristic, but
now attempts to optimise the actual attack complexity.
7 Results and Discussion
We constructed differential characteristics for each of the seven EnRUPT
variants in the EnRUPT SHA-3 proposal [5]. Table 2 lists the attack
complexity and the length of the best characteristic we found for each
variant. Recall that we fixed the length of the characteristic a priori.
Note however that nothing prevents our search algorithm from propos-
ing a shorter characteristic, padded with rounds without any difference,
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Table 2. Summary of our attacks. Only the best attack is listed for each
EnRUPT variant.
EnRUPT estimated length of
variant time complexity collision differential
[EnRUPT rounds] [message words]
EnRUPT-128 236.04 6
EnRUPT-160 237.78 7
EnRUPT-192 238.33 8
EnRUPT-224 237.02 6
EnRUPT-256 237.02 6
EnRUPT-384 239.63 8
EnRUPT-512 238.46 10
which we also observed in practice. We experimented with (much) longer
maximum characteristic lengths, but found no better long characteristics.
The time complexities vary from 236 to 240 round computations, de-
pending on the EnRUPT variant, which is remarkable. It means that the
collision resistance in absolute terms of each of these EnRUPT variants
is more or less the same, regardless of the digest length. Relative to the
expected collision resistance of O(2n/2) for an n-bit hash function, how-
ever, the (relative) collision resistance of EnRUPT is much lower for the
variants with a longer digest length than for those with a shorter digest
length.
As an example, Table 3 lists a differential characteristic for EnRUPT-
256 with an associated attack complexity of 237 EnRUPT round compu-
tations. The table also includes the differential probabilities of each step,
which were used to compute the attack complexity. A star (‘⋆’) indicates
that the differential probability can be ignored in that step because of the
technique presented in Sect. 5.2. A collision example for EnRUPT-256,
obtained using this characteristic, is given in Table 4.
Discussion. In response to these collision attacks, the designers of En-
RUPT proposed to double the s parameter to 8 [6]. As a consequence of
this, the number of steps between two message word injections is dou-
bled. Experiments with these EnRUPT variants indicate that this tweak
seems to be effective at stopping the attacks described in this paper. For
EnRUPT-256 with s = 6, we were still able to find a differential with
an associated attack complexity of about 2110 EnRUPT rounds, which is
still below the birthday bound. For higher values of the s parameter, all
the differential characteristics we could find would result in attack com-
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Table 3. Differential Characteristic for EnRUPT-256
Round Step ∆e → ∆f DP×9 totals
inject message word difference ∆m−1 = 0000000008000000x
0 0 0000000000000000x → 0000000000000000x 2−0.00 2−0.00
1 0000000000000800x → 0000000000004800x ⋆
2 9000000000000000x → 1000000000000000x 2−0.85
3 4800000000000800x → 0800000000004800x 2−3.70
4 9000000000000000x → 1000000000000000x 2−0.85
5 4800280000000800x → 0801680000004800x 2−7.28
6 90000002d0000000x → 1000001450000000x 2−6.43
7 0000280168000800x → 0001680a28004800x 2−11.02
inject message word difference ∆m0 = 0000002280000000x
1 0 90000002d0000000x → 1000001450000000x 2−6.43 2−36.56
1 0000280168000000x → 0001680a28000000x ⋆
2 90000002d0000000x → 1000001450000000x 2−6.43
3 4800280000000000x → 0801680000000000x 2−5.43
4 90000002d0000000x → 1000001450000000x 2−6.43
5 0000080000000000x → 0000480000000000x 2−1.85
6 9000000240000000x → 1000001040000000x 2−3.70
7 4800080120000000x → 0800480820000000x 2−6.54
inject message word difference ∆m1 = 0000002288000000x
2 0 9000000240000000x → 1000001040000000x 2−3.70 2−34.08
1 0000080048000000x → 0000480208000000x ⋆
2 9000000240000000x → 1000001040000000x 2−3.70
3 4800080168000000x → 0800480a28000000x 2−9.28
4 9000000240000000x → 1000001040000000x 2−3.70
5 0000200000000000x → 0001200000000000x 2−1.85
6 9000000000000000x → 1000000000000000x 2−0.85
7 4800200000000000x → 0801200000000000x 2−3.70
inject message word difference ∆m2 = 0000000208000000x
3 0 9000000000000000x → 1000000000000000x 2−0.85 2−23.91
1 0000280120000000x → 0001680820000000x ⋆
2 9000000090000000x → 1000000410000000x 2−3.70
3 4800280168000000x → 0801680a28000000x 2−11.02
4 9000000090000000x → 1000000410000000x 2−3.70
5 0000080048000000x → 0000480208000000x 2−4.70
6 9000000090000000x → 1000000410000000x 2−3.70
7 4800080000000000x → 0800480000000000x 2−3.70
inject message word difference ∆m3 = 0000000200000000x
4 0 9000000090000000x → 1000000410000000x 2−3.70 2−34.19
1 0000080000000800x → 0000480000004800x ⋆
2 0000000000000000x → 0000000000000000x 2−0.00
3 0000080000000800x → 0000480000004800x 2−3.70
4 0000000000000000x → 0000000000000000x 2−0.00
5 4800080048000800x → 0800480208004800x 2−8.39
6 0000000000000000x → 0000000000000000x 2−0.00
7 4800080048000800x → 0800480208004800x 2−8.39
inject message word difference ∆m4 = 0000000200000000x
5 0 0000000000000000x → 0000000000000000x 2−0.00 2−20.49
1 0000000000000000x → 0000000000000000x ⋆
.
..
.
.. →
.
..
.
..
7 0000000000000000x → 0000000000000000x 2−0.00 2−0.00
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Table 4. A Collision Example for EnRUPT-256
M 13x, c8x, 4bx, 45x, 62x, 70x, 17x, 6ex,
04x, f9x, 31x, 7ex, c3x, 6cx, e7x, d3x,
e1x, 21x, 78x, 6ax, 34x, 74x, 11x, 19x,
7fx, 64x, a3x, c9x, 40x, 07x, 75x, 76x,
a1x, 4fx, 90x, 86x, fdx, c7x, 33x, 4ax,
41x, 3ax, 76x, 91x, 96x, 06x, 2cx, a1x.
M ′ 13x, c8x, 4bx, 45x, 6ax, 70x, 17x, 6ex,
04x, f9x, 31x, 5cx, 43x, 6cx, e7x, d3x,
e1x, 21x, 78x, 48x, bcx, 74x, 11x, 19x,
7fx, 64x, a3x, cbx, 48x, 07x, 75x, 76x,
a1x, 4fx, 90x, 84x, fdx, c7x, 33x, 4ax,
41x, 3ax, 76x, 93x, 96x, 06x, 2cx, a1x.
EnRUPT-256(M) = bdx, 67x, 51x, 7cx, a6x, c0x, 41x, 20x,
EnRUPT-256(M ′) = 82x, e0x, 3bx, 74x, 5fx, fcx, 4ax, 64x,
e9x, f0x, 92x, c2x, 58x, c3x, 98x, b8x,
44x, 9ax, fex, cbx, 7fx, c8x, 6fx, 72x.
plexities that are far greater than the birthday bound, and thus should
not be considered to be real attacks.
Note that the failure of this heuristic attack method for s = 8 does not
preclude the possibility of attacks based on linearisation. Our experiments
only show that it is unlikely that the particular attack used in this work
can be applied directly to EnRUPT with s = 8.
8 Conclusion
We presented collision attacks on all seven variants of the EnRUPT hash
function [5] that were proposed as candidates to the NIST SHA-3 compe-
tition [4]. The attacks require negligible memory and have time complex-
ities ranging from 236 to 240 EnRUPT round computations, depending
on the EnRUPT variant. The practicality of the attacks has been demon-
strated with an example collision for EnRUPT-256.
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